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Why Would Anyone Pay? and other FAQs
(...in progress)
Why would anyone pay if they do not have to?
How
can FairPay boost sales volume, revenue and profit?
But why would anyone pay more than just enough?
What
other factors might push buyers to pay especially well?
Is this a guessing game, or would there be
suggested prices to guide buyers and increase seller control?
Won't buyers just psych out the system and drive a race to the bottom?
Won't cutting off those who pay too little anger many customers?
Does FairPay work across vendors, and does it apply to one-time sales?
Would FairPay be used as a special offer or go on indefinitely?
Will FairPay
coexist with conventional pricing?
Can't buyers game the FairPay reputation system by buying under different
false IDs?
Is this too much
to expect buyers to understand?
Isn't having to think about setting prices going to be burdensome?
What kinds of
businesses would this work for, in what forms?
Can you be more specific about how FairPay might work in a specific
context?
How hard is
it to implement a FairPay pricing system? How do I start?
What is the
status of FairPay as a business offering?
Have there been field trials or behavioral economics studies to support this
idea?
Why would anyone pay if they do not have to?
The answer is simple: Buyers who do not pay
will not get further offers.
This is the first question many people ask on
hearing of FairPay -- given its core of Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing.
It is an important question, and a central feature of FairPay is the
FairPay reputation feedback process that addresses that. With FairPay, there are consequences for not
paying -- much as there are for getting a poor credit rating.
FairPay will generally be
most useful in cases where there is an ongoing
relationship between the buyer and one or more sellers. This might be for
ongoing purchases of multiple items or services, or for ongoing subscription
access, taking the form of
a series of limited FairPay offers from the seller in response to a series of FairPay pricing
actions by the buyer.
Sellers can be expected to limit the initial FairPay offers
that they extend to new customers who lack established FairPay reputations.
They might offer only items and quantities that might typically be free
(much as with freemium pricing), so
that their risk is small. Only after the buyer establishes a history of
paying fairly will the seller continue to make FairPay offers for larger
quantities or premium items. The benefits to the buyer of not paying will be
limited and short-lived. The benefits of paying will continue and
grow.
Sellers can be expected to make these
consequences clear when they first extend an offer to sell on a FairPay
basis. This framing of the offer may be one of the most important
opportunities to set the stage for good behavior. The product/service is not offered as "free," nor as simple PWYW, but
as Fair PWYW, or perhaps better put as Pay What You Think Fair
-- essentially on trial, on approval, and on evaluation.
Perhaps the theme might be that buyers
should "pay nicely" -- and sellers will play nicely in return.
Sellers would
make it clear that zero is "acceptable" -- with regard to reputation and
future consequences -- only when that is arguably fair. Such cases of
reasonable fairness in setting a zero price might include cases in which the
buyer gives a reason why there is little or no realized value to the buyer
(much as is often required for returns), or where only very low quantities
are sampled (which might be conventionally understood as a buyer-directed
form of free sampling).
Of course a poor reputation need not be
irredeemable. Just as recency factors into credit ratings, FairPay
reputations would likely consider recency, as well. Even someone who
behaved badly some time ago might be given another chance some time later.
Care can be taken to assure buyers that they will not be "blackballed"
unfairly, without an opportunity to explain or show good faith.
This process may be clearest and work best for
early uses of FairPay that are complementary to "freemium" offerings
-- which
combine limited access to free products/services with a "pay wall" that
requires set price payments for more usage and/or premium items. As an
alternative to the pay wall and its set prices, buyers may be invited to
enter a "FairPay Zone" and permitted to stay there as long as they pay
fairly, as depicted in this diagram
(click for more commentary):
How
can FairPay boost sales volume and revenue and profit?
One of the important benefits of FairPay is that
it can potentially lead to dramatic increases in sales volume, and can
increase both revenue and profit significantly. As shown is
studies of PWYW pricing, such buyer-set pricing can result in lower average prices, but
in many cases it can increase sales so much that revenue and profit increase
dramatically. One recent study showed a variant of PWYW that
increased sales by nearly a factor of ten, and increased profit by a factor
of three. Of course FairPay should do even better than PWYW, by
adding incentives to pay fairly.
(See Isaac, Gneezy references)
Buyers typically have widely different
perceptions of value and willingness to pay. Set prices deter many
potential buyers who question that the product/service is worth that price to
them. FairPay largely removes that barrier (letting them try the
product and set the price to a level they are willing to pay), and thus enables sales to many added buyers who
might find the product valuable, and who might decide to pay enough to be
profitable, even if not the full standard price. This greater self-selection effect has been
referred to in economic studies of PWYW as "endogenous price
discrimination" (See Isaac
reference)
A graphic view of how this self-selecting price
discrimination feature of FairPay might dramatically expand revenue capture
is given in The FairPay Zone blog post "The
Long Tail of Prices -- Uncoil it with FairPay" The green area
shows the revenue under standard pricing. The red and amber areas show
potential revenue that is lost under standard pricing, but can be realized
with FairPay.
But why would anyone pay more than just enough?
The details of how to get good pricing levels will vary
for any given seller and product, but in
general, buyer behavior can be pushed to increasingly desirable levels by sellers that manage
their customer relationship well. Some of this is basic mechanics, and
some gets to broader issues.
One basic factor is that much pricing of digital
content is done on a flat-rate, "all-you-can-eat" basis because consumers
seem to prefer that to a ticking usage meter, even if that is economically
inefficient on both sides. FairPay allows buyers to not feel enslaved
by usage meters, but to view usage reports as guidance in
setting their prices. Thus buyers who are heavy users, and/or who use
lots of premium items or services, will recognize that they should pay at
relatively high rates -- possibly more than they would under conventional
flat-rate pricing.
More generally, being eligible for future FairPay offers
can be positioned as not a simple yes or no decision, but one with many
levels. Buyers might be told that those who pay better than average
will get enhanced offers, those who pay below average will get bare-bones
FairPay offers. This might relate to larger amounts of
product being made available before a price must be set, access to more premium item types, or other perks.
In this respect, FairPay can behave much like freemium.
This might be similar to the perks in frequent
flyer programs that provide upgrades, visible recognition and status, and
other special privileges. Such methods might even include making some
aspects of good payment behavior visible as a status symbol (possibly only
for those buyers who seek that kind of "conspicuous FairPayment").
Such perks might be pre-designated, but some hints of surprise bonuses.
Such expectations of surprise effects might entice buyers and make it less
desirable to try to "psych out" the process to minimize payments.
Also, a good FairPay reputation might depend not
only on how well you pay, but on how well you explain why you pay especially
well or poorly in specific cases. This would give the seller valuable feedback
not just on pricing, but on the merits of their product. Buyers might be
given visible recognition for such thoughtful feedback (such as badges)
naming them as elite partners, a form of status reward (like top ranked
reviewers on Amazon) that consumers might seek to earn and display (with
little fear of being seen as crass).
Such methods might be useful not only to move
average payers to pay more, but to convert bargain-hunters to be less
fixated on price and more on relationship and value.
What
other factors might push buyers to pay especially well?
FairPay also gets to fundamental questions of how
businesses relate to their customers, and whether they can change the
"conversation" from a zero-sum game of which party can get the most from the
other and give the least, to a win-win game, where both parties seek a
mutually beneficial value exchange. Society seems to be broadly seeking a
more win-win kind of market, and that is just what FairPay is all about.
Recent behavioral economics findings and
experiments with PWYW pricing have added weight to these ideas.
As noted for the previous question, sellers might find various ways to
directly incentivize good payments with perks and better deals, but there
are many other factors that can add to this as well.
Related to the ideas in The Cluetrain Manifesto
of markets as "conversations," Dan Pink's book "Drive" summarizes how current trends are pushing toward
more win-win behaviors, building on three motivations: autonomy, mastery,
and purpose. FairPay helps
change marketplace dialog to exploit exactly those motivations, by giving
buyers much more autonomy, opportunities to develop mastery, and ability to
reflect their purpose into their pricing decisions. Sellers who position
themselves as partners in value exchange, frame their FairPay offers
thoughtfully, and work with their customers as partners seeking mutual
benefit, will succeed in getting them to pay fairly. Those who do not may
find it difficult.
A related aspect of this is how well the seller can
position the price paid as being a well-deserved compensation for value
creation, and necessary to ensure a continuing supply of value. This
obviously factors into the modest success of musicians and game developers
with conventional PWYW sales (as for the Radiohead album sale -- why did so many pay more than one cent,
and some more than the usual standard price?).
Such
positioning is relatively easy for sellers who can claim that most of the
price goes to compensation to artists, journalists, or other human
contributors. It is also likely to benefit companies that, like Apple, are
perceived as being focused on consumer value, or who are recognized for
superior service, or for other kinds of social
benefit, such as green/sustainable, charitable, etc. Favorable positioning may be more of a challenge
for companies that are perceived negatively, or simply as commodity
suppliers, especially if not compensated by superior service or other
positives.
The addition of charitable
elements has been shown is some recent research on PWYW to very effective in
discouraging free-riding. Charity tie-ins might be very effective with FairPay as well.
(See Gneezy reference)
Is this a guessing game, or would there be suggested prices to guide buyers
and increase seller control?
There are a wide variety of pricing cues that
can be provided, and this is an area in which experimentation and ingenuity
may be useful to find the best ways to set mutual expectations.
Obviously complex behavioral issues are involved here. But in general,
FairPay is a dialog that will probably work best with a high degree of
openness about decisions and expectations.
Suggested prices may be very desirable, and
conventional set prices may also be a good reference point. Depending
on context, suggested prices might be lower than set prices but in some
situations they might be higher. For example a newspaper might have
unlimited subscriptions for $5/month on a conventional basis, and might
suggest that light users pay somewhat less than that and the heavy users pay
somewhat more, and that those that value their unique journalism add a
premium contribution. Similarly those that use only basic features
might be suggested to pay less, those that use many premium features to pay
more.
Of course there could also be minimum prices as
well, in a more limited form of FairPay. While this might be desirable
in some contexts (such as where marginal costs are high or free-riding is a
big concern), doing that would reduce the appeal of FairPay as a way to give
buyers a feeling of freedom and partnership, and confidence that they will
not suffer buyer's remorse.
Sellers might also provide reference data on how
other buyers have set their prices. These might be averages, or richer
views of the distribution of payments (such as 25, 50, and 75 percentiles).
Any of these kinds of reference prices might be
set to correspond to the usage and market segments that the buyer belongs
to, such as reflecting levels of light or heavy usage, basic or
advanced/premium services, and demographic/psychographic segments, including
affluence or student/professional status, etc. By framing offers and
guiding pricing decisions appropriately, sellers might gain the effect of
segmentations that are far more flexible and adaptive than conventional
set-price segmentation schemes.
This concept of framing is the same as that of
using "choice architectures" to "nudge" decisions while maintaining freedom
to choose (as explored in the book Nudge, by Thaler and Sunstein)
A particularly attractive method is described in
a
blog post on how suggested prices might be combined with pricing set
in terms of a differential above or below the suggested price to seek
relatively high control and predictability over buyer-set prices.
Such methods facilitate framing dialog on pricing fairness in terms
consistent with the seller's perspective.
Won't buyers just psych out the system and drive a race to the bottom?
Won't the pricing cutoff criteria get out on the
Internet?
Won't those who find out others paid less be unhappy?
The flexibility and nuance of how FairPay is
applied on an individual, dynamic basis can minimize such concerns.
There may well be a segment of bargain hunters
who will work hard to find the lowest prices a seller will tolerate.
But, depending on the market, that segment might be only 10-50% of the total
market. With FairPay, a seller can serve the highly price-conscious
market, and generate some profit from them, and, at the same time,
incentivize those who are more value-conscious to share a larger portion of
their economic "surplus."
FairPay is not as easy to psych out as it may
seem, because the lower bound is not uniform, but varies based on the
customer usage context -- it probably does not work well to disclose a
specific lower bound -- what I suggest is to give guidelines on what the
lower bound is a function of, with a fuzzy range of suggested/reference
prices under some relevant conditions of usage and satisfaction, but leave
it open-ended. (And of course in an online world, detailed usage and
context data is readily applied as a basis for pricing dialog.)
Furthermore, those who pay well are less likely
to feel suckered, because the offer management and price request process
will frame the pricing decision in terms of the particular aspects of their
usage, and of the level of premium services or perks they receive.
Unlike conventional dynamic prices (like airlines) that are unilaterally set
by the seller, the FairPay price is set by the buyer, so it inherently
cannot not be deemed unfair by the buyer -- the argument for price
differentiation becomes a shared/negotiated argument.
The heart of achieving this is to tailor the
offer, and to communicate its framing, such that the user understands the
factors affecting a fair dynamic/individualized price (for both buyer and
seller), and can make judgments in that context (understanding that other
buyers may deserve different prices given different circumstances). The
seller's rules can evolve over time and learning, and the seller can tailor
the offer to the buyer. (The rules can be further nuanced, such as with the
fuzzy logic, neural nets, etc. as used in credit management and fraud
alerting).
-
One example is for newspaper
subscriptions or e-books. Here usage becomes one key dynamic factor --
if I never finish a book, I might reasonably pay little. If I refer to
it regularly I should pay more. If I read 200 news articles/month I
should be willing to pay more than one who reads 40. Again, more for
business/finance, less for general interest. More for affluent, etc.
(See
blog post))
-
A more advanced example
might apply to considerations such as in airline pricing. I might be OK
with paying more for last minute seats held for a premium price for last
minute travel, but less for excess seats that would go empty. I might
pay more if business, less if retired/student. More for no-bump, less
for bump at will. Price discrimination is not objectionable if the buyer
gets to agree to the rationale for it (with a conventional set-price
option as fallback if the two sides diverge).
Thus, FairPay can be tuned and framed to work for all
segments, using a well-designed and customized "choice architecture." FairPay should be especially attractive to
price-conscious buyers who are reluctant to pay the set price, and to
relatively generous and fairness-conscious buyers who might pay more than
the set price (if warranted). Recent research on PWYW pricing supports
the idea that such effects can be significant and can lead to significantly
higher revenue and profit. (See Isaac, Gneezy, Chen
references.)
Won't cutting off those who pay too little anger many customers?
Rarely, if managed with care. There can be
warnings, probations (with continuation of only more limited value offers),
etc., to nudge those honestly seeking to play nicely, before sending them
back to the set-price fallback. By framing FairPay as a privilege,
possibly as a membership program or club, the contingency and
responsibilities of the privilege can be made as clear as the benefits.
Does FairPay work across vendors, and does it apply to one-time sales?
Another factor that can strengthen the
effectiveness of FairPay, as it develops, would be the emergence of shared FairPay infrastructures among multiple vendors
to enable cross-vendor
collection and sharing of reputation data. This
infrastructure might behave much like cross-vendor credit reporting and
rating services. Just as with credit reports, consumers will be more
inclined to behave well to avoid harming a FairPay pricing reputation that
many vendors will rely on.
Such cross-vendor uses of FairPay would also
extend its applicability, in that vendors might make offers in situations
likely to be one-time sales, and still get significant benefits from FairPay.
By using shared reputations derived from previous transactions with other
sellers, vendors can decide whether to extend the offer to a customer who is
new to them. At the same
time, knowing that reports of their pricing experience would go to other
vendors would provide strong incentive for the buyer to pay fairly, even
with no expectation of further purchases from that one vendor.
In a single-vendor context, FairPay can be
expected to be most effective where there is an ongoing relationship, such
as for repeat purchases, or subscriptions. Sellers will presumably want to
apply Fairpay primarily in contexts where such an ongoing relationship is
likely (either with them, or through a multi-vendor FairPay network).
Would FairPay be used as a special offer or go on indefinitely?
In general, ongoing use would seem desirable.
As long as buyers pay fairly, both parties should be happy. The buyer
maintains maximum freedom and flexibility, and the seller has a happy
customer who pays fairly -- and many more who do the same -- thus hopefully
maximizing revenue and profit. Of course the
process can end, whether across the board, or for individual buyers.
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Overall, a seller may
decide that, in his market, this method is just not the best -- and might
switch to a more conventional process, or might limit its use in various
ways.
-
With respect to specific
buyers, either side might decide they prefer conventional pricing as
producing better deals -- or as good enough and simpler.
-
Sellers may find it
desirable to use FairPay only for introductory and light use, or for
sampling, and they might require that regular,
heavy users pay conventionally.
Finding out how FairPay works
relative to conventional alternatives in specific businesses, for specific customer
segments, will be a learning process. Sometimes FairPay will not turn
out to be best, and sometimes buyers and/or sellers will have difficulty
getting it right. Complex behavioral issues are involved, and will
vary in different contexts.
Results will also vary depending
on how well offers are framed and how well relationships are managed.
Sellers who do not manage that part well may find conventional pricing
simpler and more
suited to their business.
Will FairPay
coexist with conventional pricing?
FairPay may often coexist
with conventional pricing options, as an optional variation (or as a fallback).
-
Some buyers may just prefer
the simplicity of a set price.
-
Many sellers will find it
best to have set-priced options as an alternative (and/or a penalty) for
those who do not play nicely under FairPay, or who are reluctant to try
it.
-
By positioning FairPay as
a more flexible, buyer-controlled alternative to conventional pricing,
sellers can entice buyers to put in the modest effort needed to consider
this new idea.
Combined use may be
especially valuable as a way for the seller to benefit from price-conscious
buyers who are reluctant to pay the set price, and from relatively generous
and fairness-conscious buyers who might pay more than the set price (if
warranted). Recent research on PWYW pricing supports the idea that
such effects can be significant and can lead to significantly higher revenue
and profit. (See Chen reference.)
Can't buyers game the FairPay reputation system by buying under different
false IDs?
To a degree, but this can be limited to tolerable levels by
-
using various
ID mechanisms, and by
-
limiting the value-at-risk
outstanding at a given time for any buyer who lacks a
well-established positive reputation.
As with all
reputation systems, new participants are most safely
treated as having low reputation until they demonstrate
otherwise (and once established over time, good reputations are
not lightly sacrificed). The ID problem is much
the same as for conventional pricing systems that allow
some free usage (such as a small number of newspaper
articles), then charge for more. Expanding on some
of these points:
-
A
user's Internet device IP
address can be a moderately good identifier, and
can be determined with no burden to the buyer.
(Services can be used to inexpensively detect and
reject anonymous addresses obtained through
proxies.)
-
Credit cards are widely used to verify identity
(including name and address), without making any
charge, and this adds only a modest hurdle to
buyers.
-
To
manage identity risk, a seller might typically limit
users who have yet to establish good FairPay
reputations to low value offers. These might
be for small numbers of items, and only for low
value item types, and then, as good experience is
gained, gradually extended to offer more FairPay
"credit" covering larger quantities and more premium
item types, as noted just above.
-
Other
fraud protection methods used in e-commerce can also
be applied.
Is this too much
to expect buyers to understand?
That is a concern, but one that we suggest can
be managed, and once past an initial learning curve, buyers will find it to
be liberating and natural.
Of course it will be important to educate buyers
and sellers in how FairPay transactions can work and why they are
desirable. FairPay turns many traditional ideas about pricing upside down,
and shifts considerable responsibility to the buyer. Sellers will need to
provide buyers with clear explanation of the basic process, and how and why
their pricing should be fair. A
Sample FairPay Offer is provided (for the example of a newspaper
subscription) to suggest how this might be done.
Sellers will need to carefully frame their
specific FairPay offers to set expectations on value and responsibilities,
to define relevant usage metrics, and to facilitate buyer pricing
decisions. It will be important to do this well, and to keep early
implementations as simple as possible -- but there is no reason why it can't
be made reasonably simple, in many useful contexts.
Also, it seems likely that most uses of FairPay
will be as complements to conventional pricing options. So to the extent
there is a learning barrier for FairPay, in such cases it will simply push
customers to the conventional set-price option, rather than turn them away.
By positioning FairPay as a more flexible alternative to the standard price
offer, many buyers may be motivated to take the trouble to understand how to
exploit that more attractive option.
Once buyers and sellers experience the
flexibility and nuance that can be realized with FairPay dialog processes,
they will come to see how it can actually be more intuitive and sensible
than conventional methods. FairPay can liberate both buyers and
sellers from the rigidity of conventional pricing, and enable a new level of
fluency in pricing.
Isn't having to think about setting prices going to be burdensome?
That is a critical design issue for sellers --
to be successful, a FairPay system must
be designed to be very painless for buyers to use.
What this means is that payment decisions for
very small
purchases need to be aggregated. FairPay will generally not work well if
buyers must think about pricing a single Web page or song or video clip. But it
can work well for a subscription or other bulk purchase (such as a bundle of
songs or videos or e-books or apps). This is how
most people pay now for mobile phones and cable TV – not per item, but per
month, for some large basket of items. FairPay
subscriptions might be paid monthly, and once consumers have established
good FairPay reputations, price setting might be done only annually.
Similarly, buyers could be offered bundles of items, with further bundles to
be made available after the prices are set and judged acceptable for the
previous bundle.
The better and more
well-established your FairPay
reputation, the more freedom you will have to buy a large number of items on
“approval”, and then review a usage “statement” and settle up infrequently,
with relatively low burden (much like having a high credit limit and
extended payment terms on a credit card)
What kinds of
businesses would this work for, in what forms?
How far through our economy this method can go
and exactly what forms it will take
remains to be seen.
-
A sweet spot for initial use, and the area of most urgent need,
is clearly in digital products and services. Particularly good candidates for
FairPay may include:
-
services that are
currently free, but where the seller feels urgent
need to begin charging (such as newspapers and many
video services), or
-
services that are so
pressured for revenue that conventional PWYW is a
serious consideration, in spite of its high risks (such as for music and video games), or
-
services that now charge
a high rate, and seek to broaden their market with a
more limited FairPay option for low-end market
segments.
-
FairPay it is also applicable to physical products and services,
as well, especially for those with low marginal cost (such as CDs/DVDs), or with low cost tie-ins
(such as product service and support, and other product related services). PWYW
has been found (references) to be effective for some kinds
physical products (especially as a way to attract
new customers), so FairPay should perform even
better.
A working paper on
FairPay Application/Market Segments summarizes how various specific
business segments might apply FairPay processes.
As is apparent, there are complex behavioral
issues, learning curves on the part of both sellers and buyers, and an
infinite variety of buyer/seller/product/service contexts that will affect
the pricing process. We can expect that FairPay will start with
relatively simple processes in a few business segments, and that it will
spread and gain in sophistication as experience is gained,
FairPay pricing processes can be applied by
individual providers of products/services, or more broadly as cross-vendor
networks of FairPay sellers that pool FairPay reputation data much as credit
reporting is done across vendors. FairPay infrastructures can be
developed by individual seller businesses, or by platform providers to such
businesses.
Can you be more specific about how FairPay might work in a specific
context?
Sure. Please see the working paper on
FairPay Application/Market Segments
(mentioned for the previous question) for links to blog posts that explore
specific business use cases, and check the
FairPay Zone Blog for recent additions. Some brief examples are
also given in
the introductory article on
FairPay. Teleshuttle is willing to work with businesses to assist
in developing FairPay pricing processes specifically tailored to their
needs.
How hard is
it to implement a FairPay pricing system? How do I start?
Depending on the business context and the level
of sophistication desired, implementation effort can range from very simple
to reasonably complex. In many contexts, useful FairPay implementations
can be done by an individual seller company without great effort.
As a very beneficial partial step toward
FairPay, one option is to introduce FairPay in just a survey mode,
in which transactions are done conventionally but buyers can indicate if
they feel they should pay more or less, and give their reasons. Such a
survey mode can generate valuable data on customers, and begin a mode of
dialog that can set the stage for full use of FairPay. This lets a
seller get his toes wet by starting a structured dialog with buyers about
what they want and how they value it, without need to integrate with live
pricing systems or put any revenue at risk.
Cross-vendor FairPay platform services can
build the infrastructure for managing offers, tracking pricing actions,
and maintaining reputation databases, and make that available to even
low-end sellers to exploit with simple Web services. Such cross-vendor
services can also pool FairPay reputation data, so that even small sellers
might have access to high value reputation data on large numbers of buyers,
even for one-time sales.
If you are interested in starting to use
FairPay pricing processes, please
contact us. Teleshuttle will be happy to assist businesses who wish to
implement a FairPay service for their own use, or those interested in building a multi-vendor FairPay platform for use by others.
What is the
status of FairPay as a business offering?
Current information is now in the
Overview.
Have there been field trials or behavioral economics studies to support this
idea?
Current information is now in the
Overview.
Behavioral economic research
on PWYW and related pricing issues, and studies and reports on field trials
of PWYW in various forms are very supportive of the value of FairPay as
described here. There have been numerous studies of PWYW in both
real-world and theoretic contexts, and their findings indicate that such
methods can be far more effective than many people might expect.
Selected references are discussed in the
Resource Guide to Pricing.
(Working Draft revised 8/15/10, 10/5/10, 6/27/11,
7/18/11, 10/17/11, 12/14/15) |
